A new chain launches with working software and no users. Closing that gap is usually attempted with money, and the way those funds are deployed shapes what the network becomes.
Infrastructure has to exist before anyone can build
Developers need wallets that support the chain, block explorers, node providers, indexing services, price oracles and bridges before an application is practical.
None of these arrive on their own, because building them is only worthwhile once there are users, and there are no users until they exist.
Foundations resolve the deadlock by paying for the first versions directly, which is why early ecosystem spending concentrates on tooling rather than on consumer applications.
Grants buy applications and their users
Once the base exists, funds shift to applications, typically an exchange, a lending market and a stablecoin, since those anchor everything else.
Incentive programmes then subsidise usage directly, rewarding people for supplying liquidity or transacting, which produces activity that would not otherwise be profitable.
The activity is real in the sense that transactions occur, and conditional in the sense that it depends on the subsidy continuing.
Measured activity becomes hard to interpret
Metrics such as value locked and daily transactions are used to compare chains, and both respond strongly to incentives.
Capital that moves to whichever network is paying most will move again when the programme ends, so a rising figure may be measuring a budget rather than adoption.
The informative question is what happens after the incentive stops, and how much activity persists at that point.
Funds are finite and often paid in the native token
Ecosystem allocations are usually denominated in the chain's own token, so the spending power of the programme moves with its price.
A falling price shrinks the budget precisely when the network most needs to attract developers, which makes the strategy procyclical.
Recipients also receive tokens they must eventually sell to cover costs, adding a steady stream of supply that the market absorbs alongside scheduled unlocks.
What tends to survive the subsidy
Applications that solve a problem specific to the chain, such as one exploiting unusually low fees or fast confirmation, tend to keep users afterwards.
Copies of applications available elsewhere rarely do, because there is no reason to use them once the reward stops.
The distinction is visible early in whether a project's users behave differently from the incentive schedule, which is a more useful signal than the size of the programme that funded it.